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Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution

Introduction

Ethe
moment
thatjusticeLouis D. Brandeis announced theSupreme Court's decision in the spring of _~938,_Erie Ra~Co.
Y. Tompkins has
fascinated members of the legal profession.1 Reaching far beyond Harry Tompkins's personal injury claim, Brandeis's decision addressed fundamental constitutional issues involving the locus and scope of lawmaking authority in the
American legal system. Overruling Swift Y. Tyson, a ninety-six-year-old decision
that had expanded the power of the national courts to create a "general" federal
common law independent of the common law of the states, it sought to limit that
judicial pow.erand rebalance the lawmaking structure of American government.
As massive historical changes altered the social and political significance
of Swift, however, they did the same to Brandeis's creation. To view Erie through
the historian's eyes-to consider its complex social origins, its purposeful human
crafting, and its shifting but nevertheless patterned reinterpretation over the
years-is to explore both the sweep of American experience in the twentieth
century and the practices of its legal and political elites in molding the nation's
rules, concepts, principles, and ideologies oflaw. The changing national experience and the evolving ideas and legal practices are examined here, as much as or
more than Brandeis and his decision. This book is a work of history, not of law.2
In Part 1, Chapters 1 through 3 provide an overview of the period from
1877 to 1937, highlighting a range of developments that helped create the distinct politico-constitutional age that shaped Brandeis's views and ultimately
gave birth to Erie. This period was marked by a fundamental premise concerning the role of the federal courts and the relationship between the legislative and
judicial branches. Legal commentators of all stripes came to see the judiciaryespecially the federal judiciary-as the branch of government that would most
consistently protect private property and interstate corporate enterprise. They
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viewed state and federal legislatures-and sometimes even state courts-as the
branches most likely to threaten those interests. In the decades surrounding the
turn of the century the Supreme Court expanded the reach of federal judicial
power to increase the ability of the federal courts to review government regulatory efforts, while Progressives" came to believe that significant social and
economic reform could take place only if that power were limited and state and
national legislative powers were expanded. These developments, this book argues, underlay Brandeis's constitutional theory.
Part 2 focuses on Brandeis-his judicial practice, his evolving constitutional philosophy, and his opinion in Erie for a bare five-justice majority.
Chapters 4 through 7 argue that Brandeis played the preeminent role both in
forging a majority and in shaping the Court's final opinion, and they provide insight into the meaning of Brandeis's decision by relating it to his values, politics,
personal motivations, and overall constitutional jurisprudence. These chapters
conclude that Brandeis was animated by broad personal and social purposes and
that he sought to use his opinion to institutionalize the goals and values of earlytwentieth-century Progressivism.
Part 3 considers the fate of Brandeis's decision and his Progressive ideals
in a new and different postwar world. Chapters 8 through IO argue that tumultuous historical changes ripped his opinion from its cultural moorings and propelled it into a drastically different world where judges and legal scholars viewed
it with new eyes. These chapters explore the subsequent interpretations that
fundamentally reshaped Brandeis's opinion as later generations struggled to
control the scope and function of the federal judicial power in a new politicoconstitutional age.
Chapter rr, the final chapter, sketches developments of the past quarter
century. Writing "recent" history (where the conscious and unconscious promptings of contemporary concerns are powerful) is difficult, especially when the
subject is law. Erie remains deeply embedded in continuing professional disputes, and its history bears an immediate normative significance that other historical subjects often lack. The scholarly commentary, moreover, has reached
staggering proportions. To treat that literature with justice would require a separate book, and to identify its most significant and enduring contributions would
require a perspective that is as yet unavailable. Thus, the final chapter brings the
story of Brandeis and Erie to century's end by noting its highlights.
"The word Progressive is capitalized to refer to the ideas, values, and assumptions that characterized many of the reform movements of the early twentieth century, particularly their widely shared if somewhat varied commitments
to science, expertise, efficiency, popular education, democratic government, the rights of labor, the limitation of
corporate

power, and the use of government

to ameliorate the harsh consequences

of industrialization.

does not refer to the formal Progressive party that was organized around Theodore Roosevelt.

The term
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Through its three parts, the book explores the complex relationship between changing American politics and evolving ideas concerning the practice of
constitutional government and the role of the federal judiciary. On one level, it
examines the origins and intended significance of the Court's landmark decision
in Erie. Recognizing the complexities and ambiguities of the issues involved,
it nevertheless concludes that the case has been widely misunderstood, in large
part because judges and legal scholars have too often divorced it from its full
and vital historical context. It was neither a simple articulation of the positivism
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., nor the inevitable result of a "philosophical revolution" in the Court's understanding of "law." The book suggests that
commentators have persistently overemphasized Erie's "philosophical" content
while minimizing or ignoring other more important elements. Similarly, the decision was not designed primarily to protect "federalism" or special enclaves of
state law. Rather, its more vital concern lay in broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation of powers. Nor, again, was Erie simply a product of the
"constitutional revolution" that the Supreme Court carried out after spring 1937.
It was closely related to that pivotal period, but it bore an oblique and problematic relationship to the jurisprudence of the "Roosevelt Court."
On a second level, the book is a study of Brandeis and his work as a constitutional judge. It explores the tensions that arose from his political Progressivism, his role as a justice, his strategic position on a historically specific Court, and
his developing and purposeful constitutional jurisprudence. The book posits that
Erie reflected Brandeis's deepest concerns and illuminated central elements of
his judicial practice and philosophy. More particularly, it argues that his purpose
in Erie was not only to destroy the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, reject its ostensibly outmoded jurisprudence, and terminate its generally pro-corporate consequences. Instead, his broader goal .was twofold. First, Brandeis sought to restructure the American judicial system to increase both its operational efficiency
and its capacity to provide practical justice. Erie was an integral part of his longterm effort to adapt the court system of the states and the nation to the demands
of a new interstate society. Second, Brandeis sought to constrain a pervasive if
amorphou~µicial practice by which the Supreme Court had, for more than half
a century, used common.law techniques to expand its lawmaking powers and,
all too often, to serve anti-Progressive purposes. Brandeis wrote Erie not only
to terminate the "federal general common law" but also to cabin more generally
the lawmaking powers of the national courts
. in a variety of cognate areas.
On a third level, the book uses Erie as a case study to explore the ways in
which historical processes shape and reshape fundamental ideas about legal doctrines, the role of the judiciary, and the nature of constitutional government. The
world of early twentieth-century Progressivism inspired both Brandeis and his
{
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decision in Erie, but that world was expiring as Brandeis drafted and delivered
his opinion. His reasoning and purposes could hardly have maintained their full
intended meaning in a radically new age. The book shows how succeeding generations of judges and scholars worked, sometimes consciously and sometimes
not, to remake both Brandeis's image as a constitutional judge and his opinion in
Erie. The decision was not the "founding document of modern American judicial
federalism," as one distinguished scholar has termed it, nor was it the case that
"shaped the agenda and analysis of the legal process school" that grew to prominence in the postwar decades, as another equally distinguished commentator has
declared.3 True, it was subsequently tailored to those purposes, but Brandeis's
intent was quite different. Indeed, Erie was quite different from the polestar version that Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr.-the decision's most brilliant and influential scholarly advocate-imagined and confidently proclaimed to the world.
Brandeis's decision, the book argues further, was also quite different from
the famous precedent that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly applied
during the succeeding half century. It was not the case Justice Felix Frankfurter
explained so carefully in Guaranty Trust Co. Y. York, nor the decision Chief Justice
Earl Warren implemented inWanna v. P~nor
the opinion Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., invoked so forcefuI!y in Cannon v. University of Chicago.4 Because
of the Court's immense power and prestige-and because its pronouncements
constitute "authoritative" statements of "the law" - its interpretations over the
years tend to blur, obscure, and then replace broad and complex historical
understandings with formalized doctrines. That elaborate formal practice of redefining and remaking legal rules is an essential part of the legal process. As a
matter of historical understanding, however, it is dysfunctional. Equally important, as a matter oflegal doctrine, the practice is also a powerful force for covert
change. In both its origins and subsequent interpretation, the history of Erie v.
Tompkins illuminates the way individual perspectives and social pressures have
driven the law's contingent evolution. In this critical sense, the book explores
Erie, an unusual case in so many respects, as representative.
,
As the book exploresthe complex dynamics of legal change, it suggests
a number of conclusions. It points, for example, to the historicity of that most
exalted, rigorous, and frustrating law school course (labeled differently from
school to school), "Federal Courts." Inspired by the confrontation between progressivism, professionalism, and the conservative politics of the 1920s, this now
standard course and respected field of study was largely inspired by Brandeis
and molded by Frankfurter in the process of grappling with the legal parameters of pressing social and political conflicts. Born of political commitment and
ideological conviction, the idea of "Federal Courts" as a special field of scholarly study spread in the 1930s and 1940s and then grew to maturity following
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World War II. Historical changes between the Great Depression and the cold
war, however, altered the field of study, fragmented its assumptions, and confused its purposes. Thus, the field changed substantially in the decades following
World War II, with few students recognizing the exact nature of those changes.
Indeed, only recently have "Federal Courts" scholars even begun to consider
the extent to which their subject is the confected product of distinctive historical developments.
The book shows, too, that aspects of the grand historical synthesis that
Frankfurter designed over the course of his life as scholar and judge were highly
misleading. In particular, it highlights significant issues that divided Brandeis
and Frankfurter after the mid-rojos and emphasizes Frankfurter's changing
views, his role in remolding Erie's significance for his own purposes, and his
subsequent efforts to recast Brandeis's judicial image to provide support in his
constitutional battles with Justice Hugo L. Black and the early Warren Court.
It also explores the differences that developed between Frankfurter and Hart,
his brilliant student and colleague, over the nature of the federal judicial system
and the constitutional role of the national courts. During the period of Hart's
greatest intellectual achievements, from World War II into the 1960s, he was
far more a judicial activist and nationalist (and had a far more ambiguous relationship to both Frankfurter and the Warren Court) than has been commonly
acknowledged.
More generally, the book points to the critical role "branch affinities"
played in the ideological commitments of diverse political partisans to the different branches of government. It suggests that such foundational ideas as federalism, separation of powers, and the respective constitutional roles of the various branches of government are rooted largely in expectations concerning the
practical consequences that varying allocations of institutional authority would
likely cause. The legal meaning and political significance of those foundational
ideas shift, fragment, and realign over time as controlling social and political
expectations are transformed.
Finally, in the process of probing for a "historical Erie, "the book raises
deep, if familiar, doubts about the concept of a knowable and authoritative
"original intent." 5 To provide insight into Brandeis's purposes and strategies,
the book addresses a single decision, on a clearly defined issue, well known and
widely discussed both prior to and contemporaneously with the decision, and
made by a group composed of a mere five individuals who acted only sixty years
ago and who bequeathed to us a relatively extensive and informative documentary record. Indeed, arguing that Brandeis was Erie's dominant author, the book
focuses largely on a single individual who left behind an extraordinarily rich
and voluminous collection of relevant materials, including especially valuable
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and revealing private letters and working judicial papers. Despite these quite exceptional advantages, however, the inquiry relies unavoidably on the historian's
inference and speculation. Thus, answers to even relatively simple, recent, and
specific questions - even when based on unusually abundant and illuminating
sources-remain tentative and incomplete.
The analysis, moreover, highlights problems and ambiguities that plague
efforts to use "original intent" as an authoritative legal norm. It argues, for example, that Brandeis's reasoning in Erie was flawed because he had to navigate
around the views of the four justices who joined him to create his bare majority.
At least two, and possibly all four, of them apparently misunderstood, doubted,
or disagreed with the constitutional language Brandeis chose. The opinion was
also flawed because Brandeis made conscious tactical decisions to obscure and
avoid as well as to illuminate and effectuate.6 Thus, the Court's opinion was, in
places, opaque and misleading by design. The analysis, in short, supports those
who argue that the idea of a normative "original intent" makes historical inquiry
the oracle of answers that it often cannot provide. Equally important, the analysis also suggests that a fully "authentic" original intent-even if discoverable
and applicable to the questions that later generations pose-may not be persuasive, serviceable, or even recognizable to those later generations who ask new
questions on the basis of their new and different perceptions and assumptions.
Seriously qualifying and limiting (although hardly rejecting) ideas of
original intent, the book suggests that historical evolution creates limitations and
imperatives that infuse with new meaning the words of authoritative documents.
The test of the wisdom and validity of those new meanings is only partially a
historical question. We can learn far more by recognizing and understanding
that continuous process of change and reinterpretation than by pretending that
we can discover and apply an objective and legally directive "original intent"
free from the limitations, pressures, and needs of our time.
Although the book questions both the utility and validity of most purportedly normative and directive ideas of original intent, it shows that historical analysis carries distinctive virtues. Historical analysis can clarify the ways
in which changing values, problems, and circumstances drove the evolution of
constitutional assumptions and practices; it can aid us in understanding how past
generations strove to make complex socio-legal processes work; and it can illuminate the ways in which the various institutions and rules oflaw affected the diverse elements of American society. Historical analysis need not boast complete
truth or promise authoritative answers to specific legal questions in order to help
us-and future generations-learn how we might continue to shape those processes to sustain and enhance a decent, ordered, and relatively democratic life.7
Accordingly, the book hazards a broader historical, constitutional, and
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normative conclusion. It suggests that Brandeis and his opinion in Erie, although
flawed, were admirable. This conclusion is based on a complex judgment that in
his opinion, as in his judicial career, Brandeis successfully combined four paramount virtues: he articulated sound and fundamental constitutional principles;
he served the cause of popular, representative government; he adapted legal rules
effectively to serve desirable institutional goals; and he improved the ability of
the legal system to provide practical justice to the weak and disadvantaged.
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